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A B S T R A C T
Based on a review of scholarly, regulatory and policy literatures, this article illustrates how ‘safety culture’ and
‘security culture’ are conventionally understood within the context of high-risk organizations. It identifies two
important recurring gaps in the literature: (1) the subordination of the analysis of security culture to safety
culture concepts, and (2) the anthropocentricity inscribed in both notions, which sideline the dynamic interplay
between social and technical elements in the constitution of ‘culture’. To address these gaps, the article in-
troduces concepts and heuristics from Science and Technology Studies, specifically co-production and Actor-
Network Theory. Using the concrete examples of the labelling of hazardous materials and the “four eyes”
principle, it highlights how these heuristics may open onto a more symmetrical analysis of safety and security
cultures in high-risk contexts. It thereby seeks to make visible the mutual shaping of safety and security cultures
and attend to the roles of non-human actors as active participants in such processes.
1. Introduction
Contemporary technological societies face an increasing number of
crises, such as environmental catastrophes, technological and industrial
disasters, and terrorist attacks (Bijker et al., 2014). These crises may
have non-malevolant human or natural causes, can be rooted in in-
tentional and malevolent acts, or comprise a mix of motivations and
behaviors (Khripunov & Kim, 2008). Particularly vulnerable to these
growing threats are organizations in hazardous industries such as the
nuclear industry. In order to prevent and mitigate the risks confronting
them, these organizations have developed measures to enhance first
and foremost their safety, and more recently, their security. This evo-
lution is reflected in the institutional (e.g. policy, business organiza-
tional and regulatory documentation) and academic literature, notably
on organizational culture and in the concepts of safety culture and se-
curity culture, which give consideration to human and cultural impacts
on safety and security (Antonsen, 2009). The two concepts have re-
ceived unequal attention over time, both from policymakers and
scholars (Argenti et al., 2015; Directive 2012/18/EU, 2012).
Safety culture, inspired by the concept of organizational culture,
became an overriding priority in the 1980′s. The Chernobyl accident
(1986) and the summary report of the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (IAEA, 1986) that followed triggered substantial
scientific research and discussion on what safety culture entails. The
concept was further developed in the 1990′s and early 2000′s
(Choudhry et al., 2007; Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; IAEA, 1991;
Pidgeon, 1991). As we illustrate below, amid the large number of works
that emerged, there is considerable variation in how the term is un-
derstood and applied, which raises challenges for the use and oper-
ationalization of the concept (Antonsen, 2009; Choudhry et al., 2007;
Cooper, 2000, 2016; Gilbert et al., 2018; Guldenmund, 2018, 2000;
Haukelid, 2008; Henriqson et al., 2014; Hopkins, 2016; Le Coze, 2019).
The notion of security culture gained traction only in the 2000′s, in
the aftermath of terrorist attacks such as 9/11 (Argenti et al., 2015, p.
170; Reniers et al., 2011, p. 1242). Debates about the concept of se-
curity culture are primarily situated in the nuclear field and were first
initiated and mainly organized by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA, 2001, 2016b). Studies by Jore, Malcolmson and Reniers
et al. in various areas have highlighted that the IAEA’s definition has
remained largely unchallenged in the academic literature (Jore, 2016;
Malcolmson, 2009; Reniers et al., 2011).
As security culture was not developed as a concept in its own right
but mostly transposed from literatures on safety culture, there is a lack
of understanding about the specific conceptual evolution of security
culture and its relationship to safety. This blind spot has potentially far-
reaching practical implications for organizations in hazardous
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industries, raising questions such as: What are safety culture and se-
curity culture composed of? How are safety culture and security culture
characterized? How do they interact? How can they be analyzed in
practice? This represents the first gap this paper addresses.
A second gap revealed in the literature concerns the scope and depth
of prevalent definitions of ‘culture.’ The research on safety culture and
security culture has tended to singularly focus on anthropocentric ele-
ments in safety and security without considering, or accounting for,
non-human aspects (Rollenhagen, 2010). Conceptions of both safety
culture and security culture largely ignore or fail to recognize how non-
human elements or actors (e.g., security cameras, fingerprints systems,
evacuation doors, incident reporting system) constitute and enact in-
dividual, group, and organizational cultures. Even studies that extend
the analysis of safety and security cultures to include procedures,
technologies or artifacts do not consider these as active and symmetric
components of the two cultures (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Grote &
Künzler, 2000; Guldenmund, 2007, 2000; Naevestad, 2009; Pidgeon,
1998; Reniers et al., 2011; Yoo & Lee, 2015). Symmetry represents here
a methodological precept taken from Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and
implies that no a priori distinction is made between human actors and
non-human actors in the construction of safety and security. Instead, it
acknowledges that both humans and non-humans participate in shaping
and performing both cultures; a point to which we turn below.
Taking these gaps as entry points for analysis and reflection, this
article combines and discusses concepts and approaches developed in
the burgeoning, interdisciplinary field of Science & Technology Studies
(STS), specifically co-production and ANT (Akrich et al., 2013; Callon,
1985; Jasanoff, 2004; Joly, 2015; Latour, 2005). Co-production espe-
cially focuses on the mutual shaping and co-construction of knowledge
and social orders (Jasanoff, 2004; Joly, 2015) and ANT illuminates the
interactions between humans and non-humans in a symmetrical and
relational manner. As we illustrate in this paper, mobilising these ap-
proaches facilitates consideration and development of mutually in-
formed understandings of safety culture and security culture. Moreover,
they open up questions about what is at stake in safety and security,
how these principles operate, and how they are enacted in practice.
By analyzing the literature and discussing what the two STS ap-
proaches could bring to safety and security cultures this article provides
a theoretical and conceptual frame which can bring innovative insights
regarding safety and security cultures in organizations in hazardous
industries. While an in-depth empirical analysis is beyond the scope of
the current paper, we provide two examples to illustrate the potential of
the newly developed frame for scholars, policymakers and various
practitioners working in hazardous contexts, thus paving the way for
further analyses.
In what follows, we first illustrate how safety and security cultures
are understood in policy, business-organizational and academic litera-
tures and describe in more details the two aforementioned gaps (section
2). Building on our review, the third section presents the theoretical
frameworks discussed in this paper and suggests useful tools for their
application to the study of safety and security cultures. The fourth
section addresses the two identified gaps by applying co-production and
ANT for the analysis of real-world enactments of safety and security
cultures. Our article is meant as a contribution to further research on
safety and security cultures, which usefully problematizes and ‘opens
up’ these concepts by bringing STS thinking into the safety-security
equation.
2. Safety and security cultures analysis: Variations and
consistency
In this section, we use the technique of purposeful sampling to
analyze the research on safety and security cultures in view of how
these cultures have been addressed by scholars and practitioners over
time. Adopting the principle of ‘maximum variation’, we analyzed in-
stitutional and academic manuscripts covering an extensive time range
(from 1970′s until present), with a focus towards including a diversity
of understandings, definitions and implementations in our sample
(Harsh, 2011). Our analysis highlights consistent gaps in current lit-
eratures.
2.1. Dominant notions of safety culture
The concept of safety culture was initially shaped through research
on organizational culture (Antonsen, 2009). Among the seminal works
in this area, Schein’s book, “Organizational culture and leadership”
published in 1985, especially influenced the first development of the
safety culture concept (Fucks, 2004). Schein describes organizational
cultures as a stable, constructed and multidimensional set of assump-
tions, values and behaviors shared within an organization; it protects
employees against the unknown and unwanted as it creates regularities
in behaviors (Schein, 1985). In its seminal INSAG-4 report published in
the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1991) influenced by
Schein’s work, characterizes the concept as: “that assembly of char-
acteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes
that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the at-
tention warranted by their significance” (IAEA, 1991, p. 4). This definition
builds on the IAEA’s conception of safety:
“the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks,
and the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.
‘Safety’ […] includes the safety of nuclear installations, radiation safety,
the safety of radioactive waste management and safety in the transport of
radioactive material; it does not include non-radiation-related aspects of
safety.” ( IAEA, 2016, p. 155; IAEA, 2007; Koenick, 2011).
As it followed from conceptual groundwork around the concept of
organizational culture, safety culture literatures strongly emphasized
the ‘culture’ component of safety and paid less attention to that of
‘safety’ (Antonsen, 2009; Rollenhagen, 2010). Only a few definitions of
‘safety’ were proposed, giving the impression of conceptual con-
vergence. However, among the definitions analyzed, at least two con-
tending visions can be portrayed (Antonsen, 2009; Edwards et al., 2013;
Hessami, 2004; IAEA, 2016a; Koenick, 2011; OECD, NEA, FSC (2013);
Rochlin, 1999; Rollenhagen, 2010; Slovic, 1992). The first view, which
is presently dominant in the literature, sees safety as the opposite of
posing risks. It reflects a static or passive vision of safety, as the “freedom
from harm to people caused by unintentional or random/systematic events.”
(Hessami, 2004, p.100); or as the “freedom from any unacceptable risk of
harm”(Schnieder et al., 2009, p. 6)
A second, more active vision of safety, argues that safety is enacted
through the interaction of a multiplicity of elements:
“The presence of material, symbolic and immaterial arrangements and
conditions (technological, norms, administrative, social, etc.) which have
the function to dynamically cope with direct and indirect real or potential
hazards which may result in negative consequences.” (Rollenhagen,
2010, p. 270)
This view aligns with the high reliability organization and resilience
engineering literatures, the concept of Safety-II as proposed by
Hollnagel, as well as the work around complex systems carried out by
Dekker (Dekker, 2011; Hollnagel, 2014).1
In contrast to the little attention given to the concept of safety, a
1 Hollnagel refers to the dominant vision of safety as Safety-I. This vision is
accident-centered, as it concerns itself with the absence of safety and asks why
things go wrong. In contrast, Safety-II centers on explaining why things go right
and why accidents do not occur. This shift in focus invites us to consider how
safety is enacted through the daily performance of elements that together
compose a dynamic system, rather than seeing safety as a fixed state. Following
this, safety is according to him summarized as a dynamic-event.
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multitude of scientific studies and policy documents have sought to
define and further develop the concept of safety culture. Despite several
decades of reviews and conceptual analyses, a large variation of un-
derstandings and a certain fuzziness still remains around the concept of
safety culture (Cooper, 2016; Edwards et al., 2013; Guldenmund, 2018;
Haukelid, 2008; Hopkins, 2016; Le Coze, 2019). Definitions proposed
by academic and institutional literatures indeed formulate multiple
terms and characterizations. For instance, Cox and Cox’s (1991) defi-
nition of safety culture mobilizes concepts such as ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’,
‘perceptions’ and ‘values’. Richter and Koch (2004) stress ‘meanings’,
‘experiences’ and ‘interpretations’. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission distinguishes ‘values’, ‘behaviours’ and ‘collective commitment’
as key features (NRC, 2018). Henriqson and colleagues see safety cul-
ture as an object of knowledge which “encapsulates consensual values,
beliefs, and behaviours in relation to risk and safe behavior” (Henriqson
et al., 2014, p. 469). Furthermore, whereas some definitions focus on
safety culture as a set of actions and behaviors, others emphasize per-
ceptions. Next to this variety of terms, little agreement exists con-
cerning the enactment and the implementation of safety culture. While
some scholars see safety culture as something shared by a group of
employees inside an organization (Cox & Cox, 1991), others refer to
collective elements of an organization that guide people’s actions
(Richter & Koch, 2004). Moreover, while some are centered on safety,
others open safety culture for broader elements such as organizational
aspects or objectives like quality, costs and production (Henriqson
et al., 2014). In short, although the term is widely recognized and used
in the literature, “safety culture” covers different ranges or extents
(Antonsen, 2009; Cooper, 2016; Guldenmund, 2018; Hopkins, 2016; Le
Coze, 2019).
This breadth of meanings, definitions and views, partly owing to its
roots on organizational culture, raises challenges for the comprehension
and operationalization of safety culture concepts, especially in an or-
ganizational context (Edwards et al., 2013; Gilbert et al., 2018;
Guldenmund, 2018; Haukelid, 2008; Henriqson et al., 2014; Hopkins,
2016; Le Coze, 2019). Even though some scholars have recently pro-
posed new classifications (Antonsen, 2009; Edwards et al., 2013;
Henriqson et al., 2014) or criticized the very existence of the concept
(Hopkins, 2016, 2018), a conceptual dichotomy opposing functionalist
and interpretive approaches which developed during the period be-
tween the 1990′s and 2000, analyzed as the safety culture ‘first wave’
by Le Coze (2019) and referred to as the “safety culture peak” by
Cooper (2016), still remains pivotal for understanding the roots of this
variation.
Without going into full details we attempt here to capture the main
tenets of this still influential debate.
The functionalist perspective engenders a managerial, instrumental
and top-down approach to culture. It sees ‘culture’ as a set of behaviors,
attributes, processes or policies assuring that safety remains an over-
riding priority. In this view, culture is something that an organization
has. The culture’s primary function is to support management ideology,
goals and strategies. Assessment tools to this end typically include
quantitative methods such as surveys (Huang et al., 2007; Lee &
Harrison, 2000), as well as qualitative methods such as observations
and interviews (IAEA, 2008b). Scholars assessing safety culture from a
functionalist perspective tend to view safety as an ideal that can be
managed by way of prediction and control models (Bernard, 2014;
Cooper, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). In this top-down perspective,
safety culture is derived from risk and safety management strategies
developed by management, and focuses on macro phenomena
(Naevestad, 2009). In her literature review, Fucks (2004) illustrates
these functionalist characteristics by using the IAEA definition of safety
culture (1991, p. 4) (quoted above) as an example. First, the IAEA
definition suggests that there is no pre-existing safety culture in an
organization; rather, safety has to be instituted from above. Second,
safety is formally constructed through the actions of management,
without due attention to informal safety culture. Third, an organization
is understood to have one culture rather than many. Overall, the
functionalist perspective is dominant in organizational and safety stu-
dies; and it is mobilized by a wide range of authors working in these
fields (Cooper, 2016; Cox & Flin, 1998; Furnham & Gunter, 2015;
Harvey et al., 2002; Hofstede, 1994; Kono, 1990; Lee & Harrison, 2000;
Lundberg, 1990; Reason, 1998).
The interpretive perspective (also called interpretative), influenced
by the works of anthropologists such as Geertz, Keesing and Bloch
(Bloch, 1998; Geertz, 1993; Keesing, 1987, 1994 retrieved from
Haukelid, 2008), views culture as something an organization is or does
(Henriqson et al., 2014). Culture emerges through ongoing, complex
interactions within groups “serving as prime medium for all members of
an organization to interpret their collective identity, beliefs and beha-
viors” (Glendon & Stanton, 2000, p. 194). A culture is produced by all
individuals within an organization through bottom-up, local and si-
tuated interactions. Safety culture is therefore seen as a consequence.
The focus in this perspective is on micro phenomena within organiza-
tions. Hence, it suggests that safety culture cannot be characterized
with generic features; instead, it has to be assessed through complex
descriptions of work activities and contextual components. This per-
spective argues that any attempt to a rapid change of an organization’s
culture carried out by the management in a top-down fashion is un-
likely to succeed as the model extoled will not readily align with the
interactions at work: “culture cannot be managed; it emerges. Leaders don’t
create cultures; members of the culture do. […] It is naïve and perhaps
unethical to speak of managing culture” (Martin, 1985 retrieved from
Haukelid, 2008, p. 417). Consequently, such a perspective more easily
allows for the existence of multiple, partially overlapping sub-cultures
related to specific groups and aligned on team borders in an organi-
zation, which may sometimes conflict with one another and with
management strategies (Fucks, 2004; Haukelid, 2008; Krackhardt &
Kilduff, 1990; Pidgeon, 1998; Tompson & Mchugh, 2002). These ap-
proaches typically mobilize triangulated and qualitative methods, such
as ethnographies and participant observation, to investigate the con-
textual features of safety culture. Table 1 provides a comparative
overview of these two conceptions on safety and security cultures.
Table 1
A comparative overview of the dichotomy the functionalist and interpretive perspectives of safety and security cultures.
Functionalist perspective Interpretive perspective
Managerial perspective (top-down) Contextualized perspectives (bottom-up)
Culture is constituted by management Cultures precedes attempts to produce one
Culture is a component of what an organization has Cultures are an embodiment of what an organization is/does
Culture is a cause Culture is a consequence
Culture is unique Culture are multiple and potentially opposing
Safety as an ideal rationally modelled Safety as the result of complex interactions
Assessed through quantitative and qualitative methods Assessed through qualitative methods
Focuses on global strategies (macro-phenomena) Focuses on local and situated interactions (micro-phenomena)
Anthropocentric perspective Anthropocentric perspective
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2.2. From safety culture to security culture
Despite the growing prominence of security issues, security culture
has received far less scholarly attention than safety culture, and this for
a number of reasons. The first is that the concept of security culture
emerged fairly recently, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The second is related to the historically minor demand from hazrdous
industries, which for a long time considered the intentional and mal-
icious risk to be relatively small, if not insignificant (Reniers et al.,
2011, p. 1242). The third is that security was first analyzed through the
lens of geopolitics and defense security (Burgess et al., 2018), while
organizational security has only recently come into focus (Jore, 2019).
This element touches on the perceived confidential character of se-
curity, mostly dealt with by homeland and foreign security, with only a
few people in charge of maintaining security in organizations (Jore,
2017).
Taken together, these elements help explain why the literature on
security remained within the defense and intelligence scope, and why
academic and policy developments in the organizational field in-
troduced the dimension of security within the already developed con-
cept of safety culture. This subjection of security culture to safety cul-
ture represents the other literature gap this paper addresses. Such a
subordination is to be observed through a number of elements we de-
velop below and is mainly observable through the absence of further
development of the concept of security culture and the emphasis on the
synergies between safety and security (Flory, 2013). As Jore highlights
it, this concept needs further analysis of its specificities in order to get a
grasp on its interplay with safety culture (2017).
The first definition of security culture was proposed by the IAEA in
2001:
“Security culture includes characteristics and attitudes in organizations
and of individuals which establish that protection against the loss, theft,
or other unlawful taking of nuclear material, on the one hand, and de-
liberate malicious acts against nuclear facilities or during transport of
nuclear materials, on the other, receive the attention warranted by their
significance” (IAEA, 2001).
Although it addresses different risks, this definition relies on that of
safety culture. It also led to the characterization of nuclear security as
“the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, un-
authorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear
material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.” (IAEA,
2008, p.3). It is replicated in subsequent IAEA documents (for example:
IAEA, 2009, p. 3, 2016a, p. 155), and in further academic research on
security culture (Batra & Nelson, 2012; Gandhi & Kang, 2013; Yoo &
Lee, 2015).
Definitions of security in the organizational context which are found
in academic and policy literatures reveal the same dichotomy en-
countered for safety, namely between passive and active perceptions.
For example, the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) defines security as:
“The antonym of risk when restricting the concept of risk to intentional
acts by intelligent actors (the security level is linked to the risk level, a
high security level means a low risk and vice versa)”(Aven et al., 2015).
Opting for an active perspective, Jore (2017a, p. 855) proposes a
definition emphasizing the interaction of several elements: “Security can
be defined as the ability to prepare for, adapt to, withstand and recover from
danger and crises caused by people’s deliberate, intentional and malicious
acts such as terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and hackers.”
In contrast with the concept of security, only a few alternative de-
finitions of security culture have been developed. Some studies (Jore,
2016; Malcolmson, 2009; Reniers et al., 2011) have attempted to re-
view and define security culture, yet, as Malcolmson (2009) highlights
in his study on aviation security, there is presently no operable security
culture definition that works in an organizational context. Reniers and
colleagues (2011) come to a similar conclusion and to fill this gap,
propose a definition of security culture applicable to the chemical in-
dustry:
“security culture in a chemical plant is the extent to which workers within
the organizational premises (e.g. plant employees, contractors) regard
security as important and the beliefs about how (physical, electronic,
organizational, etc.) security should be executed, bearing in mind that
hazardous substances are being handled in large quantities in the plant.
These values and beliefs will evolve into certain norms about how to
handle chemical company security.” (p. 1242).
The work of Reniers et al. (2011) is one of the first attempts to
integrate safety and security cultures; potentially in alignment with
international institutional imperatives to further integrate safety and
security concepts and methods (IAEA, 2016a, 2016b; The Hague
Nuclear Security Summit, 2014). It also resonates with integrative
safety-security approaches found in the literature (Aven, 2007; Gandhi
& Kang, 2013; Hahn, 2011; Khripunov & Kim, 2008; Kim & Kang,
2012). However, Reniers et al.’s work also raises problems and ques-
tions. First, the definitions of safety and security cultures are not mu-
tually informed; i.e., the concepts do not account for the mutual
shaping of the two cultures. Second, their conceptualization provides a
managerial or top-down vision of culture (grounded in functionalist
perspective), which insufficiently takes into account bottom-up enact-
ments (highlighted in interpretive perspectives).
2.3. An anthropocentric focus
Although the functionalist and interpretive perspectives represent
different, by and large opposing, views of safety culture (and by ex-
tension, security culture), they do share a common feature: both have
an anthropocentric focus of safety culture, which is oblivious to the role
of non-human actors in the construction of culture. As Rollenhagen
argues, safety culture remains “basically a people oriented concept”
(Rollenhagen, 2010, p. 270), which fails to account for the role of non-
humans as constitutive element of safety culture.
As illustrated in section 2.1 above, scholars associate culture with
individual or group traits, such as ‘beliefs’, ‘perceptions’, ‘attitudes’,
‘values’, and ‘behaviors’, leaving little to no room for the incorporation
of non-humans as active elements into safety culture and security
analysis (Cooper, 2016; Gilbert et al., 2018; Glendon & Stanton, 2000;
Grote & Künzler, 2000; Guldenmund, 2007, 2018; Hopkins, 2016;
Neisser, 2014; Pidgeon, 1998). Similarly, as argued by Neisser (2014, p.
92), security culture is solely “focused on social practices and institutions”.
This anthropocentric bias is indebted to sociological works on culture,
which have for a long time stressed that: “everything that is not nature has
to be seen as culture” (Antonsen, 2009, p. 3). This dominant perspective
prevents a proper and more complete understanding of the values and
agencies of non-humans (such as dosimeters, physical barriers, security
cameras or incident reports) in the dynamic performance of both cul-
tures. Overall, this anthropocentric focus of the research on safety and
security cultures may, to some extent, be explained by the following
false syllogism: Safety and security cultures both deal with culture and
culture deals with humans. Therefore they both deal with humans. The
anthropocentricity of research on safety and security cultures re-
presents the second gap this paper addresses.
Concurring with Healy, “a ‘safety culture’ [or security culture] that is
not embodied or reflected in organizational and material realities may prove
to be not only unproductive, but counterproductive” (2004, p. 288).
However, despite this lack of systematic attention to non-human agents
in safety and security cultures, some scholars have included in their
thinking ideas about the potential impacts of hardware, physical en-
vironment or software – albeit tentatively (Glendon & Stanton, 2000;
Grote & Künzler, 2000; Guldenmund, 2007, 2000; Naevestad, 2009;
Pidgeon, 1998; Yoo & Lee, 2015). For instance, Yoo & Lee, in their
security culture questionnaire asked employees to what extent guidance
documents or training and education programs impact security
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awareness (Yoo & Lee, 2015). Guldenmund (2000), Grote and Künzler
(2000) and Glendon & Stanton (2000), in their analysis of safety cul-
ture, argue in favor of considering both software and hardware. Nae-
vestad acknowledges that research on safety culture “lack[s] a proper
conceptualization of the relationship between culture, technology and
structure in high-risk organizations” (2009, p. 126). Furthermore, the
model of Reniers et al. (2011) opens up the analysis of safety and se-
curity cultures to include the impact of technologies and procedures.
These developments are promising, as they enable the much-needed
reflection on the potential role of non-humans in safety and security
cultures enactment. However, even though several authors plead for a
greater integration of non-humans in research around these concepts
(Haavik, 2011; Healy, 2004; Le Coze, 2013; Naevestad, 2009;
Rollenhagen, 2010), non-human objects and factors – when considered
- are still by and large perceived as external influences on culture, ra-
ther than appreciated as actors that constitute and actively shape the
culture in which they are embedded (Akrich et al., 2013).
Having illustrated the emergence and development of the notions of
safety and security cultures, including their roots and contending views
and enactments, we now turn to co-production and Actor-Network
Theory. As we point out below, these concepts and approaches allow us
to address the gaps identified above: the asymmetrical treatment of
security culture in relation to safety culture (which raises issues of
proper conceptualization, as well as practical issues of efficacy and
organization) and the need to consider the role and potential of non-
humans in safety and security contexts.
3. Bringing co-production and ANT into the safety-security
relation
A relatively limited number of studies have addressed both safety
and security cultures in an encompassing manner (Aven, 2007; Dupont
& Reniers, 2010; Gandhi & Kang, 2013; Hahn, 2011; Hessami, 2004;
Khripunov & Kim, 2008; Kim & Kang, 2012; Koenick, 2011; Reniers
et al., 2011). In order to tackle the gaps of the subordination of security
culture to safety culture and the overlooked role of non-humans, we
take inspiration from the interdisciplinary field of Science and Tech-
nologies Studies (STS) which considers how science and technology
affect society – and how society, in turn, affects scientific research and
technological innovation. To address the two gaps identified earlier and
therefore bringing symmetry in the analysis of both cultures, we spe-
cifically rely on the concept of co-production and on Actor Network
Theory.
3.1. Co-production
Broadly understood, co-production implies that science is not just a
force that shapes and changes society, but is in turn shaped by social
forces (Latour, 1992; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Rather than a complete
theory or model, co-production is an idiom: an invitation to consider
how science and technological orders evolve together with the socio-
political order (representations, identities, discourses, and institutions)
in specific contexts (Jasanoff, 2004). Developed by Jasanoff (2004),
among others, it sensitizes us to the mutual shaping of technology,
science and society, and has proven useful in the study of natural and
man-made disasters. In this perspective, technology and society should
not be seen as two separate spheres, but rather as interacting compo-
nents of a complete system, which mutually construct each other. For
instance, in her analysis of the evolving relations and the mutual impact
between the 1983 Bhopal industrial disaster and law, Jasanoff high-
lights “the black-boxed relationships of co-production that link the devel-
opment of material technologies with contextual social practices such as the
law” (Jasanoff, 2014, p. 95).
Arguing that material technology is too often analyzed as an in-
dependent device disconnected from its environment, Jasanoff proposes
to study how it is framed within specific governance and sectorial
boundaries.
She speaks of “civic epistemology” to denote “institutionalized
preferences for styles of evidence and argumentation that are sustained
in a durable community” (Willems, 2014, p. 44). When these implicit
styles, codes and frames are made explicit, for instance with con-
troversies and disruptions, it becomes clearer why particular socio-
technical constellations take the forms they do. These controversies
reflect a range of “already existing frames within which social actors
think and act. Focusing on the effects of such transformative events can
bring more clearly into view salient differences” between the cultures of
different communities (Willems, 2014, p. 41). The researcher is sup-
posed to analyze the controversial, potentially disruptive, moments
when new orders emerge or when existing orders clash. During these
episodes, everything is in flux and the discourses are loaded with dif-
ferent justifications and frames.
As it seeks to capture the dynamic co-shaping of two elements, co-
production is well suited for the symmetrical analysis of safety culture
and security culture. Security and safety are usually linked to different
regulatory and legal frameworks. Co-production draws attention to the
potential tensions or collisions arising from the development of specific
devices standing at the boundary points between the two cultures. By
focusing on the mutual evolution of safety and security elements rather
than treating them as isolated entities, it provides a useful lens to ex-
amine both concepts in dynamic relation to one another.
3.2. Actor-network theory
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has been developed by scholars such
as Akrich, Callon, Latour and Law from the 1980′s onwards. It is best
understood as an epistemological approach, which asserts that ‘the
social’, originating in the term ‘association’, is defined by constantly
shifting networks of relationships (Latour, 2005; Strum and Latour,
1987). These networks consist of continuously enacted local and con-
textual interactions between actors, which can be both human and non-
human. Actors’ identities are defined and re-defined through their re-
lationships, which also participate in defining, creating and stabilizing
these relations (Strum and Latour, 1987; Callon, 1985).
According to Strum and Latour (1987), humans are “social players
actively negotiating and renegotiating what their society is and what it will
be” (p.789). They organize themselves practically by mobilizing various
resources, including material forms and technologies (e.g., labels or
turnstile gates in an organization). These resources embed norms and
values, which allow actors to meaningfully coordinate and negotiate
their behaviors, relationships and activities (e.g., what is the chemical
in the container and who can enter the building). The in-
stitutionalization of such complex processes signifies that negotiations
are closed down on the social level: actors who decide to implement
these processes acquire “the ability to organize others on a large scale, even
when those others are not physically present” (idem, p.793).
ANT provides useful tools and principles for the empirical ex-
amination of security and safety cultures’ enactment.
First, it suggests that social realities are best understood by following
actors (also called actants in ANT vocabulary), both human and non-
human, and by describing their behaviors and interactions with other
humans or non-humans that are part of an actor-network. Different
from mainstream sociological approaches, ANT argues that ‘the social’
is not simply out there, and cannot be explained by relying on pre-
defined concepts or social theories that are then applied to the study at
hand (Strum and Latour, 1987). To get a grasp of a particular object,
phenomenon or issue, ANT demands to unravel and analyze all rela-
tions linking actors with each other as a network. To capture the in-
tricate and complex features of ‘enactment’, ANT prescribes the meth-
odological precept of generalized symmetry, which means that all
entities in a network can and should be described in the same terms.
The underlying rationale is that differences between entities are only
generated in a living network of relations, and should not be
C. Glesner, et al. Safety Science 132 (2020) 104950
5
presupposed. This approach is empirically determined by following
actors in their dealings and relations with others (Latour, 2005).
ANT allows analysts to highlight the interconnections between hu-
mans and non-humans and examine the agencies developed by all, in-
cluding material artifacts such as containers, buildings, and trucks. By
avoiding overgeneralizing social patterns, it enables the development of
complex, dynamic and localized understandings of the network and the
way actors are (re)defined through their interactions.
Second, ANT asserts that the actors interacting in the network may
have diverging and incompatible interests. Consequently, the stability
of the network is acquired only when interests, stakes, values are aligned
(Latour, 1987). This alignment “occurs through a process where the actors’
interests are translated (i.e. reformulated, modified, or changed) into more
generally agreeable expressions, so that several actors may support the re-
sulting translation” (Aanestad, 2003, p. 7). Some actors tend to occupy
central positions with a specific status of spokesperson within the net-
work, or an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1985). This concept enables
to detect the actor(s) structuring the network, as they establish an
“indispensable channel through which all other actants must pass” (Scoles,
2018). Identifying such actors and the translation process they co-
ordinated is key to understanding the dynamics of safety and security
cultures. It also facilitates detecting and tracing the actors interacting
within these (safety and security) networks (Heller, 2002). For instance,
an evacuation door or turnstile gate is both figurative and literal ob-
ligatory passage points, through which all other actors (employees,
regulations, badges, etc.) have to pass to interact within the network,
whether to evacuate in case of an emergency or to simply enter the
premise for their daily work. Therefore, they both enable and constrain
others actors’ behaviors.
ANT has proven useful to the study of safety and security in domains
such as bioterrorism. For instance, Mainz (2008) studied bioterrorism
risks through an analysis of anthrax powder in “letter bombs”, while
Pohler and Schillmeier (2010) examined the agency of the SARS virus.
While technically not a work of ANT, Diane Vaughan in her book “The
Challenger launch decision”, shows how defect rubbers (O-rings) were
at the origin of the Challenger space shuttle accident in 1986. She de-
monstrates how the presence of O-rings in the shuttle was the con-
sequence of, and reinforced, a deviant safety culture inside NASA,
which put the safety of the mission at threat (Vaughan, 1996).
These studies highlight that artifacts, technologies and ideas may be
considered in relation to human actors. Non-humans develop their own
strategies and interact dynamically with humans; they are not to be
taken as passive or external objects. In a nutshell, such analyses account
for the social relations in which non-humans play an active role,
thereby avoiding the pitfall of reducing social issues to human inter-
actions.
4. Addressing the gaps: Symmetry between and within safety and
security cultures
Both co-production and ANT invite us to question the view that
cultures, and ‘social’ issues more globally, are only about human rela-
tions, beliefs, or attitudes. They urge us to account for the mutual
shaping of human and non-human worlds (second gap). These ap-
proaches move beyond the conventional understanding that culture is a
social construct, which can somehow be separated from the technolo-
gies that it gives rise to, and which in turn shape it.
Based on this, we argue for bringing symmetry in the analysis of
safety and security cultures, by highlighting their mutual influence, as
well as within the two cultures, by considering both human and non-
human actors. Before illustrating how several features of ANT and co-
production can be usefully applied to the study of safety and security
cultures, we argue for a theoretical redefining of our understanding of
both concepts. Drawing on these STS approaches, safety culture and
security culture can be defined as mutually shaping networks that
connect humans and non-humans in a given sociotechnical system;
which through their interactions co-produce a certain level of protec-
tion against harm caused by malevolent agencies for security culture
and non-malevolent agencies for safety culture.
In this section, we use two examples to illustrate the application of
the two STS approaches for the study of safety and security cultures: the
labelling of hazardous material and the “four eyes” principle. These
examples lean on the literature and are informed through fieldwork
undertaken by the first author in an organization from a hazardous
industry.
4.1. Security dimension of safety devices: Labelling of hazardous materials
The labelling of hazardous materials implemented in organizations
in hazardous industries may illustrate the security implications of safety
devices (Keller et al., 1980; Su and Hu, 2008; Wang and Chi, 2003).
Such labelling can be understood as a process aimed at storing, classi-
fying, and communicating the location, characteristics and hazards of
specific materials. To give an example, a label of a nuclear or a corro-
sive substance directs attention to interactions with other human or
non-human actors in and outside the organization. This label is directly
connected to a specific material, container, storage facility, building,
intranet platform gathering and sharing features and locations of ha-
zardous materials within the organization, and to employees using or
searching for these substances. The label also implies learning, train-
ings, label glossary categorization procedures, national regulations and
shared international standards. Embedded within a global and shared
knowledge order, it participates, locks in, and reinforces social ties. An
employee manipulating a substance does not have to carry out a full
analysis of the material before using it. Through her manipulation of
the material following standard operating procedures and received
knowledge, she participates in performing the labelling network, whilst
relying on a proper enactment from the other actors.
The network of hazardous material labelling therefore performs
specific assumptions, values and injunctions through the interactions of
humans and non-humans composing the network. For example, a ha-
zardous materials inventory through an intranet platform of an orga-
nization, promotes the values of collaboration and transparency by
connecting the labels and the storage with different employees of the
organization,. These different actors co-produce a whole knowledge
order operating on the assumptions, norms and practices of com-
munality and sharing. By making visible and sharing the hazardous
elements, their composition and potential risks, a label facilitates the
safe manipulation and combination of these materials. In this way, this
non-human participates to increase the visibility, the transparency and
the prudent use of those materials (IAEA, 2019); thereby contributing
to the enactment of safety culture in an organization.
The labelling of hazardous materials also has implications for safety
culture. Making labels visible comes with the risk of increasing an or-
ganization’s vulnerability to malevolent attacks; as does strict ad-
herence to the values of openness, sharing and transparency.
Confidentiality and access control, which are key to sustaining an ef-
fective security culture, are thus potentially weakened.
4.2. Safety dimensions of the security principle : The “four eyes” principle
The “four eyes” principle encountered in some organizations in
hazarouds industries (Bodenschatz & Irlenbusch, 2019; Graff
Lambsdorff, 2015; IAEA, 2019; Osaci et al., 2018; Schikora, 2010) can
be defined as an “internal control mechanism that requires that any
activity by an individual within the organization that involves material
risk must be controlled, double checked by a second individual that is
independent and competent” (Open Risk Manual, Unknown)2. It is set
2 Open Risk Manual: https://www.openriskmanual.org/wiki/Four_Eyes_
Principle
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up in some (areas of) organizations and is designed to avoid sabotage by
implementing control by a peer. These measures, in appearance only
connecting two humans with one another, actually involve a multitude
of other actors, for instance the legal documents which enforce com-
pliance, the protected areas in which the measures are applicable, the
materials, techniques and artifacts manipulated in these protected
areas, the fences, walls, doors and gates delimiting these areas, or the
inspectors controlling the application of such measures. By tying all
those actors together, this principle enforces and facilitates compliant
behavior of workers.
In contrast with the previous example of a hazardous material la-
belling network, this network performs values and injunctions of vigi-
lance, mutual control and possibly, suspicion. It runs counter to, as
Schikora highlights (2010), the values of mutual trust, cooperation,
self-control and well-being promoted in safety culture thereby possibly
creating tensions between safety and security cultures. The “four eyes”
principle therefore concomitantly shapes the conditions for a safety
culture.
4.3. Combining co-production and ANT to the analysis of safety and
security cultures
Through these two examples, the combined use of co-production
and ANT provides a framework to detect, trace and analyze safety and
security cultures networks pertaining to non-humans and their agen-
cies, as well as their underlying values. It thus promotes a symmetrical
vision of humans and non-humans as both having agency; that is, as
active participants in networks or systems. Safety and security cultures
characterize the networks composed of a wide number of actors, which,
through their interactions, participate in (re)defining themselves, as
well as the overall network to which they belong. In this view, ana-
lyzing networks demands safety-security researchers to closely follow
actors interacting within these networks and analyzing their interplay
with others. Overall, applying co-production and ANT to the empirical
analysis of safety and security cultures in organizations permits, as il-
lustrated above, to focus on interactions between actors (both human
and non-human) which participate to enact both cultures. It also en-
ables to unveil the values, agencies, strategies they perform.
Consequently, it allows to analyze how these two cultures mutually
shape each other.
As highlighted in section 2, safety and security cultures are often
seen synergetic, two sides of the same coin (Flory, 2013). However,
commenting on the global interactions between safety and security,
Jore argues that, “although security has become an omnipresent aspect of
modern societies, the concept of security in itself has drawn surprisingly little
scholarly attention compared to similar concepts such as risk and safety”
(2019, p. 157). As it has been insufficiently addressed as a concept on
its own, the literature tended to discuss security culture only through
the lens of safety by focusing on their similarities. In consequence, the
comparison of those two concepts misses a thorough reflection on their
contextual and dynamic mutually shaping influences.
As illustrated by the two examples discussed, acknowledging the
mutual shaping and influence offers a contextual and dynamic grasp of
how safety and security cultures are characterized and how they in-
teract. Our combined approach urges us to analyze safety and security
cultures as dynamic interplay; that is, as a mutual shaping within a
regulatory, social and institutional setting or context. Through this lens
of mutual enactment, safety and security cultures are seen as arrange-
ments which are shaped with and through other elements of culture.
They are co-produced, in ways that are generative as well as potentially
incompatible or mutually exclusive. To draw a thorough image of safety
and security cultures’ interplay, tensions also demand to be scrutinized
and accounted for, rather than ignored or downplayed. Maintaining
that both safety and security cultures can always be enacted simulta-
neously presents a flaw in the dominant reasoning about safety and
security interplay. Overall, despite their important added value in the
study of safety and security cultures, co-production and ANT ap-
proaches present some limitations and jointly applying them poses
some challenges that deserve to be discussed.
As stated above, co-production remains an idiom, an invitation to
think about the mutual shaping of scientific, technological elements
with societal ones. It remains relatively vague concerning the status of
scientific, technological and societal elements. Are technologies and
science part of society? Can we analyze technology, science and society
symmetrically, by mobilizing the same vocabulary? These questions are
often left unanswered by scholars who deploy the co-production idiom.
To that respect, ANT proves useful, as it provides heuristics to
identify and explore patterns of co-production within a heterogeneous
actor-network. However, the network only exists through interactions
and relations within it, which raises the question whether anything
exists outside or beyond what the ANT researcher has identified; i.e.,
the categories s/he is able to trace. There are no ‘larger’ structural
forces which constrain or enable the networks under examination. The
main issue for ANT researchers then is to decide the bounds of in-
vestigation, be they historical, temporal or spatial, as well as which
dimensions of the world are to be taken into consideration. This places
a lot of weight on the researcher; it also suggests that important features
could escape unnoticed. To give an example, in the case of safety and
security cultures, the IAEA guidelines and other international and na-
tional regulations may be understood as interconnected actors within
the network. However, they could also easily be missed by the re-
searcher if she confines herself to staying within one part of the net-
work, e.g. by focusing only to the interactions within the site of an
organization’s enclosure.
Second, and in relation to the previous point, ANT seeks to provide
an all-encompassing way of seeing (and assembling) the social.
Contrary to mainstream sociology approaches, it seeks to equip re-
searchers with all the necessary epistemological, theoretical and
methodological tools for a thorough analysis (Latour, 2005). This
makes it difficult to combine ANT with other (sociological) approaches
which, for their part, insist on drawing analytical and ‘real’ distinctions
between micro and macro levels of analysis for instance; or between
elements that many would say are external to the network, such as
market forces and capital flows in the global political economy.
Such limitations taken into account, we believe both frameworks
are useful and potentially productive. Ideally, the idiom of co-produc-
tion and ANT approach would be used as sensitizing approaches and as
heuristics to improve and further our understanding of safety in relation
to security and culture.
5. Conclusion
This article seeks to further our understanding of safety, security,
and culture based on a literature review of these concepts within the
context of organizations in hazardous industries. It identifies two im-
portant gaps in our understanding of safety-security: the subordination
of security culture to safety culture and the anthropocentricity focus of
research on both notions. The paper states the case for more solid and
reasoned theoretical foundations to address these two gaps. To this end,
it introduces Science and Technology Studies (STS) concepts and ap-
proaches, specifically co-production and Actor-Network Theory.
Through two concrete illustrations, i.e. the labelling of hazardous ma-
terial and the “four eyes” principle the article highlights how combining
co-production and ANT opens onto a more symmetrical analysis of
safety and security cultures in hazardous contexts, such as the nuclear
arena.
By focusing on the dynamic interplay between non-human and
human elements, and by refraining from making a priori distinctions
between procedures, technology, and culture, both co-production and
ANT provide a meaningful corrective to anthropocentric perspectives.
Contrary to dominant safety and security approaches, they avoid es-
sentialist explanations for events, behaviors, and eventualities. Instead,
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they consider how various elements interact to prompt specific events
or behaviors, and explore the circumstances and the assumptions un-
derlying them. ANT is especially relevant as it explicitly proposes a
symmetrical approach to humans and non-humans. It also provides
multiple tools to detect, trace and draw the network of interactions
between actors in safety and security culture networks. Co-production,
for its part, is especially useful to designate and consider the mutual
shaping and the co-evolution of safety and security cultures. Combining
both approaches brings a much-needed symmetry to the analysis of
safety and security cultures.
In these ways, they can make a meaningful contribution to further
theoretical and empirical research on safety and security cultures in
organizations, which will benefit both scholars and practitioners.
Providing a conceptual framework which highlights both the interac-
tion between safety and security cultures, and the role played by human
as well as non-human actors in their interaction, we hope this article
contributes to future empirical explorations of safety and security cul-
tures in organizations.
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